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If an eavesdropper succeeds to compromise the quantum as well as the classical channels
and mimics the receiver “Bob” for the sender “Alice” and vice versa, one defence strategy
is the successive, temporally interlocked partial transmission of the entire encrypted
message.
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Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
from Dover Beach by Matthew Arnold (1822-1888)
Since the introduction of conjugate coding by Wiesner in the 70’s of the last
century 1, quantum cryptography 2,3,4,5,6,7 has developed into an increasingly active
area of applied research and technology, as well as a powerful tool to exploit the
quantum. From the first realization at IBM’s Yorktown Heights laboratory 5 to its
implementation across Lake Geneva 6 and various other spots around the world, in-
cluding the Boston metropolitan area 8 and the Viennese sewage system 7, quantum
cryptographic techniques are among the finest experiments ever performed.
It is often argued that, as long as an eavesdropper “Eve” can only measure the
communicated quanta, the principles of physics and thus Nature itself protect the
secrecy. Several proofs of the unconditional security of quantum cryptographic pro-
tocols have been published (e.g., Refs. 9,10) supporting this line of reasoning. Few
of them (e.g., Refs. 11,12,13) discuss man-in-the-middle attacks as a feasible crypt-
analytic method. Alas, while we have no intention to challenge these claims under
the assumptions made, not all eavesdroppers may stick to these rules. It is not
entirely unjustified to suspect that if Eve is capable of compromising the quantum
channel, she may also be capable of compromising the classical channel. Indeed, the
possible interception of classical communication is often taken as the very reason
to propose an additional quantum channel and quantum cryptographic protocols
in general. As either the security of the classical channel or classical authentication
is required for secure quantum cryptographic protocols, it is not totally unjustified
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to state that quantum cryptography cannot be considered qualitatively safer than
classical cryptography. It is nevertheless interesting to investigate the possible de-
fence strategies against cryptanalytic attacks. In what follows, after a brief review
of man-in-the-middle attacks, we shall concentrate on the interlock protocol as an
additional defence measure capable of reducing authentication. Temporal interlocks
have not yet been discussed in the quantum cryptographic context.
If Eve is able to intercept the classical as well as the quantum channels between
the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, a rather straightforward man-in-the-middle
attack can be launched 3,5,14,15,16 (see also the middleperson attack discussed in
Ref. 17), which has been discussed already in the BB84 paper 3 but seems to have
gone unnoticed in the public perception of quantum cryptography and is also not
mentioned in many security proofs.
Let us thus shortly review man-in-the-middle attacks. In the configuration dis-
cussed, we assume that a message is transferred from Alice to Bob, and hence the
scheme is forward directed. In the case of key generation, like in the BB84 protocol,
Eve’s task is simpler, as no indirect communication between Ann and Bob via Eve
needs to take place; Eve may communicate with each one of them separately. Eve’s
part consists of three main phases. The three phases are schematically represented
in Fig. 1. Very similar procedures hold for non-information-directed protocols used
to generate keys.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of a man-in-the-middle attack.
(1) In the first phase, Eve makes Alice believe that Alice is communicating
with Bob while she is actually communicating with Eve. This, of course,
can only be achieved by intercepting both classical and quantum channels.
Thereby, Alice’s message which was intended for Bob can be deciphered
and re-encoded classically.
(2) In the second phase, Eve processes the classical message to suit her goals.
For instance, the classical code can either be copied or modified. Or, a
totally new message, completely unrelated to Alice’s original message, may
be prepared for the next phase.
(3) In the third phase, Eve invokes the same type of protocol as in the first
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phase to re-encode the message prepared for Bob in the second phase, and
then sends it to Bob.
This attack is based on the problem of proper authenticating a legal sender and
receiver. Substitution of the classical channel by another quantum channel cannot
solve the authentication problem.
For a similar classical example, take a message which is encoded into two binary
substrings x and y and transmitted over two separate classical channels. Suppose
a plain message which is to be transmitted secretly is coded into a binary sequence
y = y1y2 . . ., with yi ∈ {0, 1} in any usual, unencrypted form. Let the first channel
convey an arbitrary random binary sequence x = x1x2 . . ., with xi ∈ {0, 1}. In
the second channel, an encrypted sequence z = z1z2 . . ., which is the sum modulus
two (the bitwise exclusive-or) zi = (xi + yi) mod 2 of x and y is transmitted. In
such cases, an eavesdropper can only decipher the message and recover y if both
channels are intercepted. The only difference between this scenario and the quantum
one is that, because of the no-cloning theorem, copying of a generic quantum bit
is not allowed, and hence x and z, if at least one of them is communicated via
a quantum channel, cannot pass an eavesdropper unaltered. But these obstacle
can be circumvented by completely absorbing and re-emitting a quantum code, as
described above.
Usually, classical authentication is proposed as a defence against man-in-the-
middle attacks, resulting in a quantum cryptographic scheme which relies on classi-
cal cryptology. We shall consider here another strategy based on temporal synchro-
nization. This counter strategy cannot be directly applied to key generation, as in
this case no message is transferred between Alice and Bob. But it may be helpful
in an encoded information transfer between Alice and Bob.
Suppose Eve merely intends to copy the message and not to misinform. Then, if
the quantum protocol is not instantaneous, only after completion of a sequence she
can start transmitting a copy of the message to Bob. As a result, there is a time lag
during which Eve completes receiving Alice’s message and retransmits it to Bob.
There are three shortcomings of a straightforward defence strategy based on time
synchronization: (1) Time lags are intrinsic features of many quantum cryptographic
protocols, which do not result in instantaneous codes. On the other hand, the bigger
the time lags for decryption, the easier it might be to detect eavesdropping through
man-in-the-middle attacks. (2) Proper time synchronization between Alice and Bob
would require a secure classical channel, which was excluded by the assumptions.
However, for practical purposes, synchronization via satellite-based GPS systems
may be a feasible classical synchronization channel difficult to actively intercept.
The problem remains to securely negotiate the onset of the protocol, as already
in this phase Eve may negotiate with the respective partners. (3) In the case of
misinformation (Eve misinforming Bob irrespective of the information she receives
from Alice), no copy of Alice’s original message is required, and there need not be
any time lag at all.
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A refined strategy against classical man-in-the-middle attacks is the interlock
protocol proposed by Rivest and Shamir 18 as well as timed-release cryptography
by May 19,20. The interlock protocol can be divided into four phases depicted in
Fig. 2:
(1) Alice encrypts her message by a code which is not instantaneously de-
codable. Conversely, Bob encrypts his message by a code which is not in-
stantaneous. (Part of this message may for instance consist of a classic
authentication.)
(2) Alice sends only a fraction of her encrypted message to Bob, and Bob sends
only a fraction of his encrypted message to Alice.
(3) Upon receiving Bob’s partial message, Alice sends the rest of her encrypted
message to Bob; and upon receiving Alice’s partial message, Bob sends the
rest of his message to Alice. (A generalization to the splitting of the encoded
message into more than two packets is straightforward.)
(4) Alice and Bob put the two parts of the received encrypted messages to-
gether.
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Fig. 2. Scheme of the interlock protocol. Numbers in brackets indicate the phases mentioned in
the text.
The advantage of the interlock over unbroken transmission is that until phase
three, Eve possesses only part of Alice’s and Bob’s encoded messages and is unable
to decode them for partial retransmission. Only in the final phase, the entire mes-
sages can be recovered. Thus, if time synchronization is maintained and observed,
Eve has no other chance than to fake the first messages exchanged by Alice and
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Bob.
The difference between classical and quantum interlock protocols resides in the
quantum no-cloning theorem and in complementarity: in the quantum case, copying
or measurement of the encoded messages exchanged by Alice and Bob is impossible
and would result in a randomization of these messages. Absorption, decoding and
the reemission of the re-encoded total message is still possible, resulting in a time
lag which could be monitored. Alternatively, Eve could fake the packets of the
first complete message exchanged (thus misinforming Alice and Bob), and could
subsequently copy and retransmit the (n−1)’th packet in the duped communication
in the time slot reserved for a reception of the n’th packet.
Additional authentication of Alice and Bob would make it impossible for Eve
to fake the first messages exchanged. Thus, if it would be possible, e.g., by us-
ing satellite-based GPS systems, to synchronize Alice’s and Bob’s clocks, then the
interlock protocol could be applied as an additional resource requiring classical
authentication to rule out a quantum man-in-the-middle attack by demanding to
keep the interlocked phases in temporal order. As mentioned above, the ability to
synchronize clocks represents an additional authentication resource which is not
present in the quantum cryptographic protocols so far discussed or realized.
In summary, sending interlocked partial sequences may be a practically fea-
sible defence against man-in-the-middle attacks on quantum encrypted message
transfers. It cannot be applied to quantum key generation. Classical authentication
methods remain indispensable to secure the legal identity of the sender and the
receiver. With respect to man-in-the-middle attacks, quantum cryptography shares
the same vulnerability and cannot be considered principally safer than classical
cryptography. We therefore agree with the position that quantum cryptography
should be perceived more as a secret key expansion 3,2 or, in different words, a
secret key growing technique 16 rather than as a secret key generation scheme. We
believe that, instead of glorious claims, the vulnerabilities of quantum cryptography
need to be stated clearly for a proper comprehension of the general public and also
for the risk portfolio management of potential clients.
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